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A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF MILITARY JUSTICE REFORMS
IN BRITAIN AND AMERICA
ROBERT S. PASLEY, JR.*

I.
INTRODUCTION

The Articles of War and the Rules for the Government of the United
States Navy which were adopted by the Continental Congress in 1775
were patterned after the corresponding military and naval codes in
effect at the time in Great Britain.' Since their initial adoption, they
have each been amended on several occasions, and have finally been
brought together into a single set of articles known as the Uniform
Code of Military Justice, enacted in 1950.2 Similarly, the British

statutes and procedures relating to military justice have been revised
from time to time, most recently as a result of the experience gained
in World War II. In this article it is proposed to compare some of the
more important changes introduced in the British system with the
corresponding changes in our own. Obviously, space does not permit
discussion of each change made. Accordingly, three topics have been
selected for detailed treatment: the status and function of the judge
advocate or law officer of a court-martial, the status and functions of
the Judge Advocate General and of his office and the system of appellate review. An attempt will then be made to summarize some of
the other more important changes. Of necessity, emphasis has had to be
placed on the general court-martial.
II.
BACKGROUND OF THE CHANGES

A remarkable feature of these changes is their similarity. Working
independently of each other, the British and American committees
which studied the subject found themselves grappling with almost the
same problems and in many areas came up with virtually the same
solutions. The chronology makes this clear. At the time that the Van* Assistant General Counsel, Department of the Navy; member, law faculty
of Catholic University; member, New York Bar; formerly Consultant to the
Morgan Committee in drafting the Uniform Code of Military Justice; formerly
consultant to Navy General Court-Martial Sentence Review Board. The views
expressed herein are those of the author and do not represent the opinion or
policy of the Department of the Navy. The author wishes to acknowledge the
assistance rendered by Mr. Lyttleton Fox, Counsel U. S. Navy Purchasing
Office, London, in obtaining source material for this article.
1. WINTHROP, MrILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 953 (1895 ed., 1920 Reprint);
3 WORKS OF JoHN ADAMS 68 (1851). See Pasley and Larkin, The NavyCourtMartial;Proposalsfor its Reform, 33 CoRNELL L.Q. 195, 197 (1947).
2. 64 STAT. 107 (1950); 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 551-728 (1951). (Hereafter referred
to as the "Uniform Code," and cited in subsequent footnotes as UCMJ.)
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derbilt, McGuire, Ballantine and Keeffe Committees, and Father White,
were making their respective studies of the United States Army and
Navy court-martial systems, 3 only the Oliver Report of 1938 on the
British Army system 4 was available, and that in a somewhat cryptic
summary. The Morgan Committee, which drafted the Uniform Code,
had some knowledge of the work of the Oliver Committee, and of the
two committees which were appointed after the War to study the
British Army and Navy systems (the Lewis Committee and the Pilcher
Committee), but lacked time to make a detailed study of the report of
the former, and completed its work before the reports of the latter
were available. Conversely, there is no evidence in the Lewis or
Pilcher Reports5 that these committees even knew about, much less
relied upon, any of the American studies which had been made.
To understand these British reports, and the action taken thereon,
some knowledge of at least the basic framework of British military law
is necessary. The underlying Army statute is the Army Act of 1881,0
which supplanted the Army Discipline and Regulation Act of 1879,7
itself a consolidation of the old Articles of War and the Mutiny Act.
By aquirk of history, having its origin in the traditional fear of a
standing army, the Army Act remains in force only for such time as
may be specified in an Annual Act bringing it into force or continuing
it.8 The practice has been to keep the Army Act in effect on a year to
year basis by so providing in the Army (Annual) Act, which is now
the Army and Air Force (Annual) Act. The Army Act sets forth
general provisions relating to discipline, military offenses, courtsmartial and the like. It is supplemented by the Rules of Procedure,
which are made, altered, or repealed by the Crown, through the Secretary of State for War. These rules cover, inter alia, the convening,
constitution and procedure of courts-martial, the confirmation, revision
and execution of findings and sentences of courts-martial, the necessary
forms of orders relating to courts-martial, and other matters necessary
3. Report of War Department Advisory Committee on Military Justice to
the Secretary of War (1946); Report of the McGuire Committee to the Secretary of the Navy (1945); Reports of Ballantine Committee to the Secretary
of the Navy (1943, 1946); Report of the General Court Martial Sentence Review
Board to the Secretary of the Navy (1947); WmrTE, A STUDY OF 500 NAVAL
(1947).
4. Report of the Army and Air Force Courts-Martial Committee, 1938,
English Command Paper No. 6200 (1940). English Command Papers are hereafter cited as CrMD. This report is hereafter cited by its CMD. number.
5. Report of the Army and Air Force Courts-Martial Committee, 1946, CMD
No. 7608 (1949); First and Second Reports of the Committee Appointed to Consider the Administration of Justice under the Naval Discipline Act, 1950, CMD
No. 8094 (1950), CmD No. 8119 (1951). (Hereafter these reports will be cited
only by CMD number.)
6. 44 & 45 VICT., c. 58 (Reprinted with amendments to date, in MANUAL OF
IV.TARY LAW, PART I, 1951 at 192-424 (8th ed. 1952).
7. 42 & 43 VICT., c. 33.
8. MANUAL or M--ITARY LAw, PART I, 1951 at 182 (8th ed. 1952). Cf. U. S.
CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
PRIsoxERs Am NAVAL JUsTIcE
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to carry the Army Act into effect. Finally, there are the Queen's
Regulations, which cover other matters of detail and procedure. One
striking difference between this system and our own is that many
matters which we feel it necessary to cover by statute are not found in
the Army Act but in the Rules of Procedure. 9
Since creation of a separate Air Force in 1917, that Department has
had its own Air Force Act, Rules of Procedure and King's (now
Queen's) Regulations. 10 The provisions of the two systems are virtually identical, however, and both the Army Act and the Air Force
Act are implemented by a single Army and Air Force (Annual) Act.
The Royal Navy is governed by a different system of military law.
Here the basic statute is the Naval Discipline Act of 1866, as amended."
This act is supplemented by the Naval Court-Martial Regulations, the
Regulations for Disciplinary Courts, and other instructions, orders,
forms and rules of evidence, found in the Admiralty Memorandum on
Naval Court-Martial Procedure. 12
Interestingly enough, despite the fact that Great Britain has had
a single Ministry of Defence for a longer period of time than the
United States, no attempt has yet been made in Great Britain to consolidate these three (really two) systems of military law into one,
comparable to our own Uniform Code. The British committees were
apparently sufficiently impressed by the differences in needs and
functions as between the Army and Navy to conclude that continued
difference in practice was warranted. 13 (The Air Force case was a
special one: that service, having only recently separated from the
Army, naturally adopted the Army code as its own, with appropriate
changes in terminology). An exception is the Courts-Martial (Appeals)
Act, 1951,14 which, as we shall see, sets up a single system of appeal
from decisions of Army, Navy and Air Force courts-martial.

III.

THE WoRK OF THE CoiniTEEs
The Oliver Committee was appointed March 18, 1938, under the
chairmanship of Mr. Roland Oliver, M. C., K. C., (later a Justice
of the High Court, King's Bench Division), by the Secretaries of State
9. The Rules of Procedure, 1947, with amendments to date, are found in
at 425-573 (8th ed. 1952).
(2d ed. 1933, reprint 1939) with current
amendments.
11. 29 & 30 VIcT., c. 109. Printed, as amended, in accordance with the Naval
Discipline Act, 1922 (12 & 13 GEo. 5, c. 37) in Admiralty Memorandum on Naval
Court-MartialProcedure 4-27 (B.R. 11, revised 1937; reprinted with amendments, 1943). (Hereafter cited as B.R. 11.)
12. See note 11 supra.
13. CMD No. 8094 at 6, 1 6 (1950). But cf. id. at 53, ff 24.
14. 14 & 15 GEo. 6, c. 46.
MANUAL OF 1VIILITARY LAW PART I, 1951
10. See MANUAL OF Am FORCE LAW
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for War and Air to examine the court-martial system under the Army
and Air Force Act, and particularly to consider the question whether
it was desirable and practicable to allow a person convicted by courtmartial a right of appeal to a civil court. The committee held private
hearings, at which all interested parties were invited to testify (very
few responded), and submitted its report on July 28, 1938.15 The committee found the existing system eminently satisfactory and was particularly struck by the fact that, although it had made a "studied search
for cases of injustice covering a period of 20 years, and from all over
the world," it had discovered not a single one. 16 The committee's report did make a number of important recommendations concerning the
appointment, constitution and functions of the Judge Advocate General's Office, as well as some relatively minor recommendations on
other matters. It recommended against the granting of a right of
appeal to a civilian tribunal. The committee's report was published by
the Government in May of 1940, with the explanatory statement that,
in view of the fact that the war had broken out in the meantime, the
Government found it impossible to place any of the committee's recommendations into effect until hostilities should end. 17
On November 4, 1946, the War Office and Air Ministry appointed
a new committee, under the chairmanship of the Honorable Mr.
Justice Lewis, O.B.E., a member of the High Court, King's Bench
Division, to review the recommendations of the Oliver Committee
"in the light of the experience gained in the late war and of the
composition of the Army and the Royal Air Force," to reconsider the
question of appeal, to investigate the punishing powers of courtsmartial and of commanding officers, and "to make recommendations
upon these and kindred matters."' 8 The Lewis Committee held hearings, examined witnesses and studied over 200 memoranda submitted
to it. On April 13, 1948, it submitted an exhaustive report containing
some 60 or 70 specific recommendations. 19 While agreeing generally
with the conclusions of the Oliver Report, the Lewis Report suggested
a number of fairly radical changes, and in particular recommended
that a right of appeal to a civilian tribunal be granted. Some of the
more important of these recommendations will be discussed in greater
detail below.
Although some of the recommendations of the Lewis Committee
were put into effect at once, final action on the others was delayed until
a study could be made of the naval system. On February 17, 1949, the
First Lord of the Admiralty appointed a committee, under the chair15. CmDNo. 6200 (1940).
16. Id. at 5.
17. Id. at 2.
18. CMDNo. 7608 at 3 (1949).
19. CMD No.7608 (1949).
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manship of the Honorable Sir Gonne St. Claire Pilcher, M. C., a Justice
of the High Court, Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division, to consider whether any changes were desirable in the administration of
justice under the Naval Discipline Act.20 The Pilcher Committee held
hearings and considered memoranda submitted to it, and submitted
two reports, the first on February 20, 1950,21 dealing with the naval
court-martial system as such, and the second on November 6, 1950,22
dealing principally with the summary powers of commanding officers.
The Pilcher Committee also recommended that a civilian appellate
court be established, though on a slightly different basis from the one
proposed by the Lewis Committee.
In January 1951 the Government published its conclusions on the
recommendations of the Lewis and Pilcher Committees in the form
of a report by the Minister of Defence to Parliament, outlining (1) the
recommendations of each committee which had been accepted, with or
without modification; (2) those on which a final decision had not yet
been reached; and (3) those which had not been accepted. 23 The more
important of these conclusions will now be discussed.
IV.
THE LAW OFFICER OR JUDGE ADVOCATE

One of the most interesting developments has been in the position
of the law officer or, as he is called in Britain, the judge advocate of
the court-martial.
A. PriorLaw
Prior to World War II, the situation was as follows:
U. S. Army: A "law member" was designated by the appointing
authority for each general court-martial. 24 Such designation was a
jurisdictional requirement but, so long as the order appointing the
court included a law member, he could be excused from attending
(although this rarely happened in practice) without defeating the
court's jurisdiction. 25 He was preferably to be a member of the Judge
Advocate General's Department, when one was available, otherwise
an officer deemed especially qualified by the appointing authority. The
decision of the latter on the availability of a JAGD officer was final
26
and could not be collaterally attacked in habeas corpus proceedings.

20.

CMD No. 8094 at 5 (1950).
21. CMD No. 8094 (1950).
22. CMD No.8119 (1951).
23. Courts-Martial Procedure and Administration of Justice in the Armed

Forces, CmD No. 8141 (1951). (Hereafter cited only by CMD number).
24. 41 STAT. 788 (1920), 10 U.S.C.A. § 1479 (1927) (Article of War 8).
25. This rule was changed by the Elston Act, 62 STAT. 628 (1948).
26. Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U.S. 103 (1950).
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The law member was a full-fledged member of the court, and therefore
had to be a commissioned officer. His rulings on admissability or exclusion of evidence were final, but on other interlocutory questions
were subject to being overruled by majority vote. 27 He did not rule
on challenges.28 He retired with the court and voted on the findings
and sentences. He customarily instructed the other members of the
court on the law applicable to the case, the rule of reasonable doubt,
and so forth, but this was in closed session and did not become part of
29
the record.
U. S. Navy: The Navy had no law member, but a "judge advocate,"
whose duty it was to present the case for the prosecution. He had the
further duty of advising the members of the court on legal questions,
and to see that the rights of the accused were protected, especially if
the latter was not represented by counsel. 30
British Army: The general court-martial had a "judge advocate,"
who sat with the court in open and closed sessions but did not vote.
Within the United Kingdom, he was designated by the Judge Advocate
General; elsewhere by the appointing authority. He did not have to be
an officer, but could be a barrister temporarily commissioned for that
purpose, or a regular civilian judge who sat in wig and gown. If he was
an officer, it was not required that he be legally qualified. His duties
were, generally, to represent the Judge Advocate General and to advise
the court, as well as the prosecution and defense, on questions of law
and procedure, to sum up the evidence, to advise the court on the law
relating to the case and to act impartially to see that the interests of
the Crown and of the accused were fully protected. His opinions were
not binding on the court, but the court was enjoined not to disregard
them except for very weighty reasons. 31
British Navy: Each general court-martial had a judge advocate.
Normally, he was a duly appointed Judge Advocate of the Fleet, or
his Deputy, who was present within the command; otherwise the convening authority appointed a deputy judge advocate, or in default of
such appointment, the president of the court did so. 32 In general, the
duties of the judge advocate of a naval court-martial were similar to
those of the judge advocate of an army court-martial. Again, his
33
opinions were advisory only and not binding on the court.
27. 41 STAT. 793 (1920), 10 U.S.C.A. § 1502 (1927) (Article of War 31). This
rule was also changed by the Elston Act, 62 STAT. 631 (1948).
28. 41 STAT. 793 (1920), 10 U.S.C.A. § 1502 (1927) (Article of War 31).
29. This custom became a requirement under the Elston Act, 62 STAT. 631
(1948).
30. NAVAL COURTS AND BOARDS §§ 359, 400, 401 (1937 ed., 1945 reprint).
31. Rules of Procedure, 1947, Rule 103; MANUAL or MILITARY LAW, PART I,
1951 at 39, 59, 500-01. (8th ed. 1952).
32. Naval Discipline Act, § 61, supra note 11; B.R. 11 at 16, 50, 52. (Rev.
1937, reprint 1943).
33. B.R. 11 at 52-54 (Rev. 1937, reprint 1943).
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B. PresentLaw
Uniform Code of Military Justice: Under the Uniform Code, every
general court-martial, Army, Navy, or Air Force, has a law officer, appointed by the convening authority. He must be a commissioned officer, who is a member of the bar of a federal court or of the highest
court of a state, and who is certified as qualified for such duty by the
Judge Advocate General of his service, and he is required to be present
at the trial.34 He rules upon all interlocutory questions, other than
challenges. His rulings are final, except that a ruling upon a motion
for a finding of not guilty, or on the question of sanity, may be overruled by a majority of the court. 35 He is required to instruct the court,
on the record and in the presence of the accused and of counsel for
both sides, as to the elements of the offense charged, as well as on the
presumption of innocence, the rule of reasonable doubt, and so on.36
By virtue of this provision, the Navy has gained what it previously
had not had, a law officer for its general court-martial. The position of
the Army law member, on the other hand, has been substantially
changed, in that he has been taken off the court, deprived of his vote,
required to give his instructions in open court, and, in general, assimilated much more than had previously been the case to a civilian
37
trial judge.
Lewis Report: The Lewis Report made only a few recommendations
with respect to the position of the judge advocate of a British Army
(or Air Force) court-martial:
(1) That the judge advocate (if retained as such) should not retire
with the court when the latter considers its findings.38 The Oliver
Committee had made a similar recommendation. 39 It was premised
mainly on the consideration that, since the judge advocate had already
instructed the court on the law of the case in open court, it was unnecessary for him to retire with the court when it voted on the findings, and that for him to do so created the appearance at least of possible injustice to the accused.40 This recommendation was put into
effect administratively in 1947.41 However, the judge advocate continues to retire with the court, but does not vote, when it considers
34. UCMJ, arts. 26, 39, 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 590, 614 (1951).

35. UCMJ art. 51 (b), id. § 626.

36. UCMJ art. 51 (c), ibid.
37. This was a highly controversial point. In the drafting of the Uniform
Code, before submission to Congress, it was one of the few issues which had to
be resolved personally by the Secretary of Defense.
38. CmD No. 7608 at 26, 55 (1949).
39. Cmim No. 6200 at 13-14 (1940).
40. Id. at 14 (1940); CMD No. 7608 at 26 (1949).
41. CMD No. 7608 at 26 (1949); CMD No. 8141 at 6 (1951); Rules of Procedure,
1947, Rule 63(c) ; MANUAL OF MILITARY LAW, PART I, 1951 at 480 (8th ed. 1952).
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the sentence or any interlocutory matter such as a motion for a finding
of not guilty.42
(2) Alternatively, and preferably, that the judge advocate be replaced by a Judge Martial, or Deputy Judge Martial, furnished by the
Judge Advocate General, who would be president of the court and act
as a judge at an assize court, robed as King's Counsel, and who should
cast the deciding vote on the sentence in the case of a tie.43 The Government has not accepted this recommendation, but has agreed to require
that in all cases the judge advocate be a person with legal training. 44
PilcherReport: The principal recommendations of the Pilcher Committee under this heading were as follows:
(1) That in all serious cases, (e.g., capital eases and cases presenting
difficult questions of law or evidence) judge advocates be chosen from
King's Counsel and other barristers experienced in criminal law, the
4
Deputy Judge Advocate of the Fleet, or former holders of that office. 5
(2) That in cases of less difficulty and gravity, specially selected
Supply Officers with the requisite legal training and aptitude for trial
work (so-called "starred" officers) be appointed as judge advocates. 4
(3) That in relatively minor cases, "unstarred" Supply Officers be
employed. 47
(4) That civilian judge advocates sit in legal robes. 48
(5) That the judge advocate give all his advice in open court, that he
sum up on the legal issues before the finding and that he not retire
49
with the court when it votes on the finding.
(6) That the president be empowered to authorize the judge advocate, on the advice of the latter, to hear arguments as to admissibility of evidence and applications for separate trials in the absence
of the court. (A typical case where this might be appropriate would be
where the admissibility of a confession was in issue, and the arguments thereon might well affect the court's opinion as to the guilt or
innocence of the accused.) 5 0
(7) That courts be instructed by the Admiralty to follow the advice
given by the judge advocate or record the reason for their failure
51
to do so.
42. Rules of Procedure, 1947, Rule 63 (b);
1951 at 480 (8th ed. 1952).
43. CMD No. 7608 at 43, 58 (1949).
44. CMD No. 8141 at 15 (1951).
45. CMD No. 8094 at 21-22, 44-45 (1950).

MANUAL OF MILITARY LAW,

PART I,

46. Id. at 22-23, 45. The term "Supply Officer" means an officer in the Supply
and Secretariat Corps, some of the members of which are assigned legal duties.
47. Id. at 23, 45.
48. Id. at 25, 45.
49. Ibid.
50. Id. at 24-25, 45.
51. Id. at 23-24, 45.
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(8) That the judge advocate not be required to advise the court on
the rules and regulations of the service generally, since he might be
a civilian whose competence would not extend to such matters, and
consequently it would not be suitable for the court to be obliged to
52
follow his recommendations thereon.
The Government has accepted all the above recommendations, except the last two. It is willing that the judge advocate's, advice be
binding on points of law, and has accepted (7) to this extent. This
53
limited acceptance makes (8) unnecessary.
Summary: By virtue of the above changes, the position of the law
officer of the court in each of the four systems (now really three) is
much closer than formerly. The only significant differences which
remain between the British and American systems in this regard are:
(1) In Britain, the judge advocate may be a civilian.
(2) In the British Army, the rulings of the judge advocate are not
binding on the court, even on questions of law, although the court
is enjoined not to disregard them except for weighty reasons.
(3) In Britain, the judge advocate still retires with the court (but
does not vote) when it considers the sentence, or if it should close
to consider any interlocutory matter.
There is, however, a significant difference in practical result. In
America, faulty or incomplete instructions by the newly created law
officer have been a major cause of reversals by the Court of Military
Appeals. No such result appears to have happened in England, where
for a long time judge advocates have been summing up and giving instructions on the law in open court. The difference is no doubt due to
the novelty of the arrangement in this country and consequent inexperience on the part of law officers.
VI.
THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL
Many of the recent reforms have focused on the position and status of
the Judge Advocate General. In this area the British and American
systems have shown a number of important differences. If anything
this divergence has increased, although in all cases the purpose of the
changes has been the same, namely, to give greater independence and
responsibility to the Judge Advocate General.
In the United States, the Judge Advocate General was, and is, a
member of the armed force with which he serves, with the rank of
major general or rear admiral. In Britain the Judge Advocate General
52. Id. at 24, 45.
53. C D No. 8141 at 19, 21, 22 (1951).
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of the Land and Air Forces is a civilian official appointed by the King.
Until 1951 he was subject to the orders of the Secretaries of State for
War and Air. For nearly a century prior to 1893, however, he was a
Privy Councillor, a member of the Government and usually a member
of Parliament, with direct access to the Sovereign. From 1893 to 1905,
he was the President of the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division
of the High Court. 54 The Judge Advocate General of the Fleet is also
a civilian official, usually a King's Counsel55in civil practice, who acts
as legal adviser to the Board of Admiralty.
A. Recent Changes- United States

(a) Army: The Elston Act, which formed Title II of the Selective
Service Act of 1948, provided for a separate Judge Advocate General's
Corps, with a minimum strength, permanent appointments and a
separate promotion list. Under this act, it is provided that the Judge
Advocate General shall be the legal adviser of the Secretary of the
Army and of all officers and agencies of the Army, and that all members of the Corps are to perform their duties under the direction
of the Judge Advocate General. The Judge Advocate General, the Assistant Judge Advocate General and other general officers in the
Corps are to be appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, from among officers of the Corps who are recommended by the Secretary of the Army.56
The stated purpose of these provisions was to establish in the
Army a corps of qualified legal officers who should be entirely free
from command control. Congress felt so strongly on this subject that
the House Committee on Armed Services wrote these provisions into
the bill as it was originally proposed by the Army, despite the opposition of Under Secretary Royall and Lieutenant General Collins, and
retained them in spite of "strenuous objections" by Secretary of War
Patterson and the then Chief of Staff, General Eisenhower.5 7
Unquestionably, establishment of the Corps has been an important
morale factor in attracting legal officers to the Army. It may be questioned, however, whether it was ever calculated to free courts-martial
from "command control." Obviously it could not do this because courtsmartial were and are appointed by local commanders, not by the
Judge Advocate General or anyone acting for him. And no one has ever
seriously contended that the Judge Advocate General in Washington
was a creature of the military. Even if he were, it is hard to see how
establishment of the Corps changed his position very much. He was,
54. CMD No. 7608 at 7 (1949).
55. CMD No. 8094 at 14 (1951).
56. 62 STAT. 643 (1948), 64 STAT. 270 (1950), 10 U.S.C.A. §§ 61-1 through 65
(Supp. 1951).
57. H.R. REP. No. 1034, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-11 (1947).
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and is, legal adviser to the Secretary and a member of the Army Staff.
However, on military justice matters, he reports directly to the Secretary of the Army. 58 It may further be questioned whether the new
"Corps" differs very substantially, in the final analysis, from the old
Judge Advocate General's "Department."
As a matter of fact, during the hearings on the Air Force Organization Act of 1951, Congressman Kilday observed that in establishing
the Corps the members of the House Armed Services Committee were
under the misapprehension that they were transferring a certain
amount of the military functions from the command to the Judge
Advocate General, whereas in fact they had done no such thing but
had merely provided for a separate promotion list and for accelerating
promotions of some JAG officers. 59 And in the hearings on the Army
Organization Act of 1950, General Collins seemed to have forgotten
60
all about his prior opposition to the idea of a Corps.
(b) Air Force: The Elston Act was enacted after the Air Force had
won its status as a separate military department by virtue of the
National Security Act of 1947.61 Accordingly, a bill was introduced into
Congress to prevent any hiatus in the military justice situation in the
Air Force. This bill, which became law on June 25, 1948, provided that
"the Articles of War and all other laws now in effect relating to the
Judge Advocate General's Department, the Judge Advocate General
of the Army and the administration of military justice within the
United States Army" should apply to the Air Force. 62 (Italics added)
The Elston Act had been approved the day before, June 24, 1948, but
was not to become effective until February 1, 1949.63 Faced with this
legal puzzle, the Air Force propounded a paradox: The Elston Act consisted of two main parts, Sections 201 through 243 being amendments of
the Articles of War and Sections 246 through 249 establishing the
Corps. Obviously, said the Air Force, Congress intended to apply the
new Articles of War, but not the Corps, to the Air Force. The first
part of this astonishing proposition received judicial sanction in 1950,
but the court's opinion made no distinction between the two parts of
the Act, and by implication at least applied them both to the new Air
Force. 64 However this may be, the question was thoroughly explored in
the hearings on the Air Force Organization Act of 1951,65 and Congress
58. U.S. Govt. Organization Manual 1952-53 at 139 (Rev. as of July 1, 1952).
59. Hearings before Full Committee on Armed Services on H.R. 1726, 82d
Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1951). The short-term effect has actually been to delay
promotions.
60. Hearingsbefore a Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services on
H.R. 5794, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 6176 (1950).
61. 61 STAT. 502 (1947), as amended, 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 626 et seq. (Supp. 1950).
62. 62 STAT. 1014 (1948).
63. 62 STAT.642 (1948).

64. Stock v. Department of the Air Force, 186 F.2d 968 (4th Cir. 1950).
65. Hearingsbefore Subcommittee No. 2 of Committee on Armed Services on
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accepted the Air Force plea that a corps not be imposed upon it, although the Act is so worded as not to preclude the Air Force from
establishing a corps if it so desires. 66 The Judge Advocate General of
the Air Force, unlike his counterpart in the Army, reports to the
Secretary through the Chief of Staff on all matters. 67 In fact he is officially described as "legal adviser to the Chief of Staff." 68 However,
he is made a permanent major general.69
(c) Navy: The Navy has no General Staff, comparable to the Army
Staff or Air Staff, and the Judge Advocate General of the Navy reports
directly to the Secretary and not through the Chief of Naval Operations. Congress has made no recent change in the statute establishing
his office,70 but has provided for a group (not a corps) of legal
specialist officers who receive legal training and are assigned to perform legal duties only, but who are also available to perform certain
other duties formerly assigned only to "unrestricted" line officers.71
(d) Uniform Code: The Uniform Code does not change the above
situation, although the question whether a corps should be established
for each service was considered and debated at length.72 In effect,
Congress has decided to "wait and see" before imposing on the Navy
and Air Force the "experiment" it has instituted for the Army. However, by a separate section of the statute which enacted the Uniform
Code, it was made mandatory that the Judge Advocate General of
each armed force, exclusive of the then incumbents and exclusive of
the Coast Guard, be a member of the bar with at least eight years'
experience in legal duties as a commissioned officer.7 3 As a matter of
fact, the new system of appellate review provided by the Code curtails
some of the powers previously granted the Judge Advocate General
of the Army under the Elston Act.
H.R. 399, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951); Hearingsbefore Full Committee on Armed
Services on H.R. 1726, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951); Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, U. S. Senate, on H.R. 1726,
82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951).
66. 65 STAT. 332 (1951), 10 U.S.C.A. § 1840 (Supp.1951). See SEN. REP. No.
426, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1951).
67. 65 STAT. 327-29 (1951), 10 U.S.C.A. § 1811-15 (Supp.1951).
68. U. S. Govt. Organization Manual, 1952-53 at 165, (Rev. as of July 1, 1952).
69. 65 STAT. 332 (1951), 10 U.S.C.A. § 1840 (Supp. 1952). See 97 CONG. REc.
646 (1951).
70. 21

STAT.

164

§ 428 (Supp. 1950).

(1880),

29

STAT. 251 (1896),

71. 61 STAT. 869 (1947), 34 U.S.C.A.

§ 211b

40

STAT. 717

(Supp. 1951).

(1918), 5 U.S.C.A.

72. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services on
H.R. 2498, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 618, 626-29, 637, 641, 677, 704-05, 742, 7691 804-06,
832, 977-80, 1115-21, 1124-29, 1134-36, 1289-97, 1298-1302 (1949); Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, U. S. Senate, on
S.857 and H.R. 4080, 81st Cong. 1st Sess. 120, 157-58, 167, 203, 206, 282-83, 287,
291-93, 315-19 (1949); H.R. REP. No. 491, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1949); SEN.
REP. No. 486, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1949).

73. 64 STAT. 147 (1950), 50 U.S.C.A. § 741 (1951).
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B. Recent Changes-

GreatBritain

(a) Army and Air Force: Following the lead of the Oliver Committee, the Lewis Committee made the following principal recommendations with respect to the Judge Advocate General:
(1) That he be appointed on the recommendation of the Lord Chancellor and be responsible to him.
(2) That he continue to act in an advisory capacity to the Secretaries
of State for War and Air.
(3) That the three separate departments of his office, the Military
Department, 74 the Air Force Department and the "Judicial Department," cease to be combined in one office.
(4) That the Military Department be set up as a separate Department under the Secretary of State for War, in charge of a "Director
of Army Legal Services," staffed as at present with officers having
legal qualifications, who would have the duty, as at present, of preparing cases for trial by court-martial and, where necessary, conducting such cases for the prosecution.
(5) That the Air Force Department be similarly constituted under
the Secretary of State for Air.
(6) That the Judge Advocate General be responsible only for the
work done by the "Judicial Department" (which is staffed with civil
servants with legal qualifications and officers "seconded"-i.e., detailed
-from the Military and Air Force Departments), namely, the furnishing of judge advocates for courts-martial, the review of court-martial
proceedings, and advising on questions of law arising out of such proceedings.
(7) That this separation of functions extend to Commands abroad
in cases where the latter are furnished with a Deputy Judge Advocate
General and with Deputy Directors of Army and Air Force Legal
Services.
(8) That the rates of pay, pension, terms of service and promotion
in the new Departments be such as to attract lawyers of skill and
experience.
(9) That the title "Judge Advocate General" be changed to "Chief
Judge Martial," that his status and remuneration be not less than
that of a puisne (i.e., associate or assistant) Judge of the High Court
5
of Justice, and that he retire at the age of 70.
The Government has accepted all these recommendations except the
last-named. The new constitution of the office and separation of func74. The term "Department" as here used does not mean an "executive department," but what we would call a "Division" of the Judge Advocate General's Office.
75. CmDNo. 7608 at 23-25, 55 (1949).
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tions were accomplished administratively on October 1, 1948. 70 The
provisions for appointment by Her Majesty, on the the recommendations of the Lord Chancellor, of the Judge Advocate General and
his immediate assistants, for their legal qualifications, rates of pay,
retirement, pensions and so forth, are set forth in Part II of the CourtsMartial (Appeals) Act, 1951, enacted August 1, 1951. Under this act,
the Judge Advocate General (unless appointed from among the Vice
JAGs or Assistant JAGs) is required to have 10 years' experience
as a barrister-at-law or advocate, his retirement age is 70, and his
salary is to be determined by the Lord Chancellor with the approval
of the Treasury. Corresponding provisions, with lower figures, are
77
established for his assistants.
(b) Navy: The Pilcher Committee made no specific recommendations with respect to the status of the Judge Advocate of the Fleet.
However, Part II of the Courts-Martial (Appeals) Act, 1951, provides
for his appointment by the Crown upon the recommendation of the
Lord Chancellor, and provides for the same legal experience, tenure,
rates of pay and so on, as in the case of the Judge Advocate General
of the land and air forces.7 8 For some reason which does not immediately appear, no provision is made in the Act for a Deputy or
Assistants.7 9 Apparently it was also thought unnecessary to provide
for a separation of functions comparable to that instituted for the
Army and Air Force.
Summary: It is evident from the foregoing that the British have
instituted far more drastic changes in the status of the Judge Advocate
General than have we. Not only is he, as formerly, a civilian; he is now
completely outside the military departments, serving the latter only
in the capacity of an adviser, and is responsible, together with his
entire office, to the Lord Chancellor, who not only recommends his
appointment but even fixes his salary. If such an arrangement were
even conceivable under our Constitution, we would say that he was
a member of the judicial branch of the Government.
VII
APPELLATE REViEW

Rather than prolong this article by comparing the different systems
of appellate review which have prevailed in the United States Army
and Navy during World War II, during the brief period the Elston
76. CvM No. 8141 at 5, 14, 18 (1951).
77. 14 & 15 GEO. 6, PART II, §§ 29-35 (1951).

78. Id. § 28.

79. Perhaps because of the different function performed in the Royal Navy
by the Deputy Judge Advocate of the Fleet, who is a naval officer. He does not
share the duties of the Judge Advocate of the Fleet, and is a "deputy" in name
only. See CMv, No. 8094 at 11, 14 (1950).
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Act was law and since the Uniform Code came into effect, only the
appellate system established by the latter will be outlined, as a basis
for comparison with the changes which have been introduced in
British military law.
A. United States
Under the Uniform Code, every sentence of a court-martial must be
approved by the convening authority before it may be ordered executed. 80 In general court-martial cases, the convening authority is
required to obtain the written opinion of his staff judge advocate or
legal officer before acting on the sentence.81 In addition, every sentence
which affects a general or flag officer, or extends to death, dismissal,
dishonorable or bad-conduct discharge, or confinement for one year
or more, must be reviewed by a Board of Review, established in the
office of the Judge Advocate General of the service concerned. Each
board of review consists of at least three legally qualified officers or
civilians. The board of review reviews the entire record and has
authority to weigh the evidence. It affirms only such findings of guilty,
and the sentence, or such part thereof, as it finds correct in law and
fact and determines, on the basis of the entire record, should be approved. If it sets aside the findings and sentence it may order a rehearing (unless the reversal is based on lack of sufficient evidence);
82
or it may order that the charges be dismissed.
In addition to the boards of review established in each service, the
Uniform Code establishes a Court of Military Appeals, consisting of
three civilian judges, appointed by the President, with the advice and
consent of the Senate, each for a term of fifteen years and each at an
annual salary of $17,500.83 This court reviews the record, after review
by a board of review, in three types of cases:
(1) All cases in which the death sentence has been imposed, and
all cases of general or flag officers.
(2) All cases which the Judge Advocate General of the service
concerned orders forwarded to the court for review.
(3) All cases in which, upon petition of the accused and for good
cause shown, the court has granted a review. 84
Under (3), the accused has 30 days from the time he is notified of
the decision of a board of review to file his petition. The court is Te-,
quired to act thereon within 30 days of receipt.8 5 The court considers
only questions of law, and, except in mandatory cases under (1), con80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

UCMJ
UCMJ
UCMJ
UCMJ
UCMJ
UCMJ

arts. 60-65, 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 647-52 (1951).
art. 61, id. § 648.
art. 66, id. § 653.
art. 67 (a), id. § 654.
art. 67 (b), ibid.
art. 67(c), ibid.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 6

siders only the issues which are raised by the Judge Advocate General
in cases under (2), or which are specified in the grant of review under
(3).86 The court has the same power as a board of review to order a
87
rehearing or to order dismissal of the charges.
There remain a small residue of general court-martial cases (e.g.,
sentences of confinement for less than one year, without dismissal or
discharge) as to which review by a board of review is not required.
These are examined in the office of the Judge Advocate General. If
the latter finds them not legally sufficient, or for any other reason so
directs, they are then reviewed by a board of review, but in those
cases the accused does not have the right to petition the Court of
88
Military Appeals for a further review.
TheUniform Code provides that a finding or sentence of a courtmartial shall not be held incorrect on the ground of an error of law
unless the error materially prejudiced the substantial rights of the
accused. 89 This rule applies to each successive review, from that by the
convening authority to the final review (if granted) by the Court of
Military Appeals.
The Uniform Code provides for the appointment of qualified appellate counsel by each Judge Advocate General, to represent the
Government and the accused respectively, before a board of review
or the Court of Military Appeals, when directed by the Judge Advocate General or requested by the accused, as well as in certain other
situations specified in the Code. The accused may, if he chooses, be
represented by civilian counsel provided by him.90
In addition to the above system of review, the Code permits an
accused, in certain types of cases, to petition the Judge Advocate General for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence or
fraud on the court. Such petition must be filed within one year after
approval of the sentence by the convening authority. If it is filed
while the accused's case is pending before a board of review or the
Court of Military Appeals, the board, or court, as the case may be, acts
upon it instead of the Judge Advocate General. 9'
While much of the above is new, a good deal of it was found, in one
form or another, under the old systems. Both the Army and the
Navy had boards of review, the former by statute since 1920,92 the
latter by administrative action. 93 Moreover, all Army and Navy general court-martial sentences were at least reviewed in the Office of the
86. UCMJ art. 67 (d), ibid.
87. UCMJ art. 67 (e), ibid.
88.
89.
90.
91.

UCMJ art. 69, id.
UCMJ art. 59 (a),
UCMJ art. 70, id.
UCMJ art. 73, id.

§ 656.
id. § 646.
§ 657.
§ 660.

92. 41 STAT. 797 (1920).
93. See Pasley and Larkin, The Navy Court Martial: Proposals for Its Re-

form, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 195, 223 (1947).

1953]

REFORMS IN BRITAIN AND AMERICA

Judge Advocate General.m The Elston Act created a Judicial Council
of three generals which had powers somewhat comparable to those
of the Court of Military Appeals. 95 That act also authorized a petition
for a new trial, actually on a broader basis than the Uniform Code.9 &
B. GreatBritain
British Army: Prior to the recent changes the system of review
followed in the British Army approximated that followed in the
American Army before the introduction of boards of review, i.e., prior
to World War I. The findings and sentence of a general court-martial
required confirmation by the King, or an officer deriving authority from
him. This authority was usually delegated to the convening authority,
but within the United Kingdom, and occasionally abroad, the authority
to confirm a sentence of death or penal servitude, or cashiering or
dismissal of an officer, was not delegated. The confirming authority
could, before confirmation, send a case back to the court for revision
of the finding and sentence, or of the sentence only. Proceedings in
revision took place in closed court and no additional evidence could
be taken. The sentence could not be increased in such proceedings. If
the findings and sentence were not confirmed, the trial was considered
a nullity, and a re-trial could be ordered by the confirming authority.
However, unless the King was the confirming authority, the re-trial
was not supposed to be ordered without prior consultation of the Judge
Advocate General.
A confirming authority subordinate to the King could withhold confirmation and refer the case to a superior confirming authority. The
confirming authority could not alter or amend a finding (other than
by directing proceedings in revision) but he was permitted to mitigate,
remit, commute, reduce, or suspend execution of a sentence.
No appeal as such existed, but the proceedings were examined in the
Office of the Judge Advocate General, and if found illegal or "unjust,"
the findings and sentences were subject to cancellation, variation, or
remission by "superior military authority." Moreover, the accused
could at any time thereafter petition the confirming authority or any
reviewing authority to reconsider his case. If such petition involved
a question of law, it was referred to the Judge Advocate General. In
addition, an accused had an unlimited right to petition the Sovereign
97
for relief.
British Navy: The Navy review system was substantially similar.

94. 41

(1927).

STAT.

797 (1920), 21

95. 62 STAT. 635 (1948).
96. 62 STAT. 639 (1948).

97. MANUAL OF
7608 at 14 (1948).

STAT.

164 (1880), as amended, 10 U.S.C.A. § 1522

MILrrARY LAW, PART I,

1951 at 52-57 (8th ed.

1952);

Ci~n No-
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If a confirming authority had any doubt as to the legality of the
finding or sentence, he referred it to the Admiralty before putting it
into effect. No death sentence (except for mutiny) could be ordered
executed until it had been reviewed by the Admiralty. All other
sentences were reviewed by the Admiralty after action by the confirming authority. The Admiralty had power to suspend, annul, or
modify any sentence, except a death sentence, which could only be
remitted by the Crown.
In reviewing court-martial sentences, the Admiralty referred them
to the Judge Advocate of the Fleet for his report. The Admiralty generally followed the advice of the latter on legal matters, but was not
required to do so.
Similar rights of further petition to superior military authority or
to the Sovereign were available to an accused convicted by a Navy
court-martial, as in the case of an accused convicted by an Army
court-martial. 98
The Courts-Martial (Appeals) Act, 1951: As we have seen, the
Oliver Report recommended no change in this system of review, as it
applied to the Army and Air Force, except with respect to the status
and organization of the Office of the Judge Advocate General. 99 However, the Lewis Committee recommended that an appeal on questions
of law should be allowed to a special "Courts-Martial Appeal Court,"
to consist of three members drawn from among the Chief Judge
Martial (the proposed new title for the Judge Advocate General), the
Vice-Chief Judge Martial, the Judges Martial of his Office and a panel
of King's Counsel approved by the Lord Chancellor. 100 They further
recommended that this system of appeal should eventually replace
the system of confirmation, and of review by the Judge Advocate
General, but that the right to petition the Sovereign should continue. 101
However, superior military authority would continue to review the
sentence with a view to possible mitigation, remission or commutation, and an accused could continue to petition superior military
10 2
authority to this end.
The Pilcher Committee recommended a similar system of civilian
review, but recommended a single appellate tribunal independent
of all three Services to hear appeals from all courts-martial. This
tribunal should consist of three members drawn from a panel of
King's Counsel (or other experienced criminal counsel) appointed
by the Lord Chancellor. The opinion of such tribunal would (although
98. Naval Discipline Act, §§ 53 (1), 69, 74, 74A, supra note 11; CMn No. 8094
at 14-15 (1950).
99. Cwm No. 6200 at 12-13 (1940).
100. Cim No. 7608 at 29-33, 56-57 (1949).
101. Id. at 32, 57.
102. Id. at 33-35, 57.
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delivered in open court) take the form of advice to the Board of
103
Admiralty, which would be expected to act in accordance therewith.
The Government has accepted these recommendations in principle,
although it has made some substantial modification therein. For example, while it has gone along with the idea of a civilian appellate
tribunal, it has retained the existing system of confirmation, on
which the appeal to the new tribunal has been superimposed. On the
other hand, the new civilian court is on an even higher level than
envisaged by either of the committees. This court has been established
under the Courts-Martial (Appeal) Act, 1951, enacted August 1, 1951,
and effective May 1, 1952.104
This Act provides for an elaborate panel from which members of
a "Courts-Martial Appeals Court" are to be drawn and which consists
of:
(a) The Lord Chief Justice and the puisne Judges of the High Court.
(b) Lords Commissioner of Justiciary nominated by the Lord Justice General.
(c) Judges of the High Court of Justice in Northern Ireland nominated by the Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland.
(d) Other persons of legal experience appointed by the Lord Chancellor.

In any particular case, the Court is summoned by direction of the
Lord Chief Justice with the consent of the Lord Chancellor, and is
duly constituted if it consists of an uneven number of Judges, of not
less than three, of whom at least one must be drawn from classes
(a), (b) or (c) above unless the Court is directed to sit outside the
United Kingdom and the Lord Chancellor thinks it expedient to dis105
pense with this requirement.
The appeal is only from the findings, not the sentence, and must be
on leave of the Court.1 06 Except in the case of a death sentence, the accused is first required to file a petition with the Admiralty or the

Secretary of State for War or Air praying that his conviction be

quashed, and must wait until a prescribed period has elapsed or until
he is notified that his petition has been denied.

07

He may then file a

petition for leave to appeal to the Court, within a period to be prescribed by rule. In considering whether to give leave to appeal, the
Court may consider the opinion of the Judge Advocate General or the
Judge Advocate of the Fleet. 10 8 If the Court considers the application
103. CMD No. 8094 at 38-41, 47 (1950).
104. Courts-Martial (Appeals) Act, 1951, 14 & 15 GEo. 6, c. 46; MANUAL OF
MIITARY LAW, PART I, 1951 at 637 (8th ed. 1952).
105. Courts-Martial (Appeals) Act, 1951, 14 & 15 GEO. 6, c. 46, §§ 1-2.
106. Id. §§ 3, 4.

107. Id. § 3(2).

108. Id. § 4(6).
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for leave to appeal to have been "frivolous or vexatious," it may order
that the sentence shall begin to run from the date of the order dismissing the appeal. 10 9 It may also impose costs, in a proper case, against
the unsuccessful party to an appeal. 110
The Act provides that the Court shall allow the appeal if it thinks
that the finding is unreasonable, cannot be supported having regard to
the evidence, or involves a wrong decision on a question of law, or
that on any ground there was a miscarriage of justice. In all other
cases, the Court shall dismiss the appeal; it may also dismiss the appeal,
even if it finds error, if it considers that no substantial miscarriage of
justice has actually occurred. If the Court allows the appeal, it shall
quash the conviction."'
The Court ordinarily has no power over the sentence, but it may
reduce the sentence to the legal limit, or if it finds some, but not all,
of the findings to have been proper, or that the accused should have
been convicted of a lesser included or "substituted" offense, it may
substitute such lower sentence as it deems proper. The Court may
also quash a sentence on the ground of insanity 12 Unless the Court
otherwise directs, the sentence, if upheld, begins to run from the date
it would have begun to run had there been no appeal, and not from the
113
date of affirmance by the Court.
The decision of the Court is ordinarily final, but if the Attorney
General, upon application made to him within fourteen days, certifies
to the appellant, the Admiralty, the Army Council, or the Air Council,
that the decision involves a point of law of exceptional public importance and that it is desirable in the public interest that a further
114
appeal should be brought, an appeal to the House of Lords shall lie.
However, the Royal prerogative of mercy is not affected by the Act.1 6
The Act allows the Judge Advocate of the Fleet, and the Judge
Advocate General, to refer cases to the Court when in their opinion, a
question exists which should be determined by the Court, and allows
the Admiralty, or the Secretary of State for War or Air, to do so if
some new matter has come to their attention which makes it expedient
that the finding be considered by the Court. 116
If a conviction is quashed under the Act, the accused may not be
tried again for the offence involved, either by court-martial or by any
other court." 7 Apparently there is no provision in such a case for a
new trial or a rehearing.
109. Id. § 4(7).
110. Id. § 13.

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. § 5.
Id. § 6.
Id. § 6(5).
Id. § 7.
Id. § 27.
Id. § 20.
Id. § 16.

1953]

REFORMS IN BRITAIN AND AMERICA

The Court is empowered to subpoena documents and other exhibits, to obtain opinions from the members or judge advocate of the
court-martial which heard the case, examine witnesses and refer
questions to a special commissioner for inquiry and report. 118
The Act makes provision for legal aid and for the assignment by
the Court of counsel to appellants who lack the means to retain private
counsel. 119 It also requires the Admiralty, Army Council, or Air Council, as the case may be, to defend appeals from convictions by courts120
martial of their respective services.
The Act includes numerous other provisions on procedural matters,
21
and provides for the issue of rules of court.'
In general, the whole scheme is remarkably similar to that set up
under the Uniform Code, but with these significant differences:
(1) Unlike the Court of Military Appeals, the Courts-Martial Appeals Court is in no sense part of the executive, nor is it a court which
specializes in military law. Its members may, and do in fact, include
the Lord Chief Justice and other high-ranking judges. It must be summoned on the direction of the Lord Chief Justice with the consent
of the Lord Chancellor.
(2) It can hear appeals from any court-martial, general, district,
field, or disciplinary, without regard to the severity of the sentence
imposed.
(3) On the other hand, there are no mandatory appeals, except for
those cases referred to the Court by the Judge Advocate of the Fleet,
the Judge Advocate General, the Admiralty, or the Secretary of State
for War or Air.
(4) The Court has broad powers to consider evidence, and even
to receive new evidence.
The Courts-Martial (Appeals) Act has been in effect since May 1,
1952. It does not appear that the new Court has been flooded with appeals since that date.12 Its first appeal, from an Army court-martial,
was heard on May 1, 1952.123 The Lord Chief Justice himself, and Mr.
Justice Hilbery and Mr. Justice Devlin, both of the Queen's Bench
Division of the High Court, heard the appeal. It involved the case of
Private (Acting Corporal) Tom Houghton, R.A.S.C., convicted of the
murder of Captain Herbert Mason, at Fayid, Egypt, on February 9,
1952. The Lord Chief Justice first announced some procedural rules
which the Court would follow:
118. Id. § 8.
119. Id. § 10.
120. Id. § 12.
121. Id. §§ 21-26.
122. Perhaps because of the possibility of incurring costs, or the penalty attached to "frivolous or vexatious appeals." See notes 109, 110 supra.
123. Regina v. Houghton, The Times, May 27, 1952.
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(a) It would adopt the usual practice of the Court of Criminal
Appeal and treat applications for leave to appeal from convictions involving capital sentences as the hearing of the appeal itself.124 (However, this rule would be followed only if the death sentence still stood
after action by the confirming authority; if it had been commuted, the
appeal would be treated like an ordinary appeal.)
(b) The Court would not ordinarily grant an appellant leave to
be present at the hearing of his appeal, 125 but would do so only when
satisfied that the presence of the appellate would be useful and would
serve the ends of justice.
On the merits, the Court dismissed the appeal. The opinion, delivered
by the Lord Chief Justice, was admirably brief, at least as reported
in The Times:
"After stating the facts in the case, his Lordship said that this was the
sort of case which the Court dealt with over and over again in its civil
capacity. The motive was the oldest in the world for murder, consuming
and overwhelming jealousy. An attempt had been made to show that the
appellant was insane; but there was no evidence that the man was suffering from any disease of the mind."
The first appeal from a naval court-martial is reported in The Times
for November 15, 1952.126 Former Lieutenant-Commander Alastair
Campbell Gillespie Mars, D.S.O., D.S.C. and Bar, had been convicted
on four charges of disobeying orders and being absent without leave,
and had been sentenced to dismissal. The appeal was heard before the
Lord Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Hilbery, and Mr. Justice Havers, of the
Probate, 1Divorce and Admiralty Division of the High Court. It appeared that on each of two separate occasions the appellant had failed
to comply with a document appointing him an officer of a named
naval vessel and directing him to report for duty, his justification
being that he had written to the Admiralty "declining" the appointment, and stating that he intended to disregard it. The documentary
evidence introduced on the first charge consisted of an Admiralty
document informing the appellant that the Lords Commissioners of the
Admiralty had appointed him Lieutenant-Commander R.N. of her
Majesty's ship Phoenix and directing him to repair to his duties at
Portsmouth on April 28, 1952. This document was signed: "By command of their Lordships, J. G. Lang."
Appellant's counsel offered the ingenious, albeit highly technical,
124. The accused had merely applied for leave to appeal against the
conviction.
125. The Act (§ 11) provides that an appellant shall not be entitled to be
present at the hearing except where rules of court so provide or the Court
gives him leave. In this case appellant had asked that such leave be given, so
that he might be seen by a Home Office alienist.
126. Regina v. Mars, The Times, Nov. 15, 1952.
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argument that, while this document amounted to notification of a purported appointment, no actual order by the Lords Commissioners of
the Admiralty had been proved at the court-martial; in fact that the
clerical officer of the secretary of the department concerned had
testified that she had prepared the appointment of the appellant after
receiving a note from the Naval Assistant to the Second Sea Lord;
that this did not prove that an order had been issued by the Lords
Commissioners, indeed was inconsistent with that. This bit of chop
logic utterly failed to convince the members of the Court, but Queen's
Counsel Paget pursued it none the less. The Lord Chief Justice observed that the whole discipline of the Army, Navy and "everything
else" would fail if counsel's argument was right, and asked whether
the First Lord and Second Sea Lord were to be called on to prove
an order every time that one was given. Counsel blandly assured him
that this would not be so at all, cheerfully admitting that, if the conviction were reversed, the only result would be that in the future
appointments would be differently worded!
In delivering the Court's judgment, Lord Chief Justice Goddard
observed that, when appellant had written to the Admiralty returning
the document and saying that he would not obey it, "a senior civilian
officer, a principal, wrote to him, sending back the document, and
saying:
"'I am to inform you that the fact that you have been appointed to
her Majesty's ship Phoenix bears no relation to your recent request to be
permitted to retire from the Royal Navy. That request has been laid before my Lords and their decision on it will be communicated to you in
due course. You are in the meantime, therefore, required to act as directed
in the enclosed letter of appointment.'
"If that was not an order he (his Lordship) did not know what was.
The appellant's appointment had been given in the way that all such
Admiralty orders were signified-on a printed form. That printed form
was the appointment because it contained the words 'hereby appoint.' In
the opinion of the Court the court-martial had been right and there was
nothing in the appeal, which would be dismissed."
It would appear that the new Courts-Martial Appeals Court does not
propose to be hyper-sensitive in passing upon appeals from convictions
by courts-martial.
VIII
OTHER CHANGES
Enlisted Men on Courts-Martial
Both the Lewis Committee and the Pilcher Committee considered
the question whether warrant officers and enlisted men ("other ranks"
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or "ratings") should be eligible to sit on courts-martial, only to reject

it. 1 27 The Lewis Report, however, includes a minority view on this
point, in the form of an addendum filed by Mr. A. R. Blackburn,
M.P.12 8 In accordance with the views of the majority, however, the
Government has made no attempt to introduce this change. In this
respect, therefore, the British system differs from our own under
which, if an enlisted accused so requests, one-third of the members
of a general or special court-martial must be enlisted persons.12 9
Legal Aid Before and During Trial; Pre-Trial Investigation
Under the British Army Rules of Procedure in effect prior to 1947,
an accused was entitled to be represented at his trial by private counsel
paid for by him, or represented by an officer known as the "defending
officer," or assisted by any other person, known as the "friend of the
accused." A "friend" could advise the accused and suggest questions
to be put by him to witnesses, but could not himself actively participate
in the trial. 30 The Navy system was similar, except that if the accused
counsel, it was the duty of his
had no specific wishes as to defense
3
'
him.'
assist
to
Divisional Officer
The Oliver Committee had recommended that this system be
strengthened by providing legal aid similar to that provided to
civilians prosecuted for crime.132 This recommendation was further
studied by a special committee appointed by the Army Council in
1946. On recommendation of this committee, a system was put into
effect in 1947 in the Army, Navy and Air Force under which an accused is now provided with legal aid in certain types of cases.'3
The Lewis Committee stated that it welcomed this scheme, but
made the additional recommendations:
(a) That it be the duty of every commanding officer to insure that,
before a man is brought before him charged with a court-martial
offense, he should be advised by a suitable person (not necessarily
a lawyer) of his own choice or, failing such choice, selected by the
commanding officer.'3
(b) That the taking of the Summary of Evidence (generally equivalent to our pre-trial investigation) be by a permanent district courtmartial president or other officer with suitable experience or legal
qualifications, that the evidence thereat be given on oath, and that
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

No. 7608 at 49-51, 60 (1949); CMD No. 8094 at 19 (1950).
CmD No. 7608 at 61-62 (1949).
UCMJ art. 25(c), 50 U.S.C.A. § 589 (1951).
CmD No. 7608 at 20 (1949).
CiJm No. 8094 at 12 (1950).
CMD

132. Civm No. 6200 at 15 (1940).

133. C D No. 7608 at 20-21 (1949); CmD No. 8094 at 58 (1950).
134. CMD No. 7608 at 21, 54 (1949).
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the accused should be present and be entitled to be represented by
135
counsel.
The Government has accepted the first of these recommendations,
but still has the other under advisement. 136 (Some portions of the
latter actually represent existing procedures, for example, an accused
is now entitled to be present at the taking of the Summary, and the
evidence thereat may be on oath if the accused so demands or the
7
commanding officer so directs.) 13
On the problem of legal representation during the trial, the Pilcher
Committee recommended:
(a) That the accused's Captain see that a competent defending
officer be available, whether or not the accused requests help in this
regard, and for this purpose full use be made of Supply Officers who
had had the more advanced legal training.
(b) That the title "accused's friend" be abandoned in favor of
"defending officer."
(c) That the defending officer be allowed to examine and crossexamine witnesses as of right, and not as a matter of the court's
permission.
(d) That when served with charges, each accused be given a leaflet
explaining his rights before, during, and after trial.138
The Government has accepted all these recommendations except,
strangely enough, the one concerning the title to be given to the accused's counsel, a matter which one would hardly expect to be regarded as controversial. 139
The Pilcher Committee also made a number of recommendations
concerning pre-trial investigations, including the following:
(a) That the accused be informed of his rights in all cases, and not
merely, as at present, "in serious cases likely to form the subject of
a court-martial."1 40
(b) That the accused's Divisional Officer take a more active part in
pre-trial investigations, and be under a duty to examine or cross14
examine witnesses wherever this seems advisable. '
These recommendations are still under advisement by the Government.142
It would appear that the British services still follow somewhat
135. Id. at 21-23, 54-55.
136. CMD No. 8141 at 5, 12-13 (1951).

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id. at 13.
CMD No. 8094 at 28-29, 46 (1950).
CMD No. 8141 at 20, 22 (1951).
CMD No. 8119 at 8, 19 (1951).
Id. at 8-9, 19.
Cwm No. 8141 at 24 (1951).
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different practices in this area, and that our own system is more advanced. 143 The Uniform Code provides:
(a) That a defense counsel be appointed for every general or special
court-martial, without prejudice to the accused's right to retain private
counsel. 144
(b) That at a trial by general court-martial both trial counsel and
defense counsel be legally qualified and be certified as competent by
the Judge Advocate General, and at a trial by special court-martial,
defense counsel be legally qualified if trial counsel is. 14
(c) That a formal pre-trial investigation be held before any
charge is referred to a general court-martial, and that accused have
the right to be present, to cross-examine witnesses, to present testimony in his own behalf and to be represented by counsel.146
Vote on Findingsand Sentence
United States
Prior to the Uniform Code, the rules applicable to the Army and
Navy differed. The Code, following in the main the prior Army procedure, requires a two-thirds vote for a finding of guilty (except where
the death penalty is mandatory, in which case unanimity is required).
Similarly, it requires a two-thirds vote on the sentence, except that if
the sentence exceeds ten years a three-fourths vote is required, and
for the death sentence a unanimous vote on the sentence (but not on
the findings) is required. 147 Voting is by secret written ballot, 148 and
the findings and sentence are announced as soon as determined. 149
GreatBritain
Army and Air Force
The rule has been that findings and sentence were determined by
majority vote, except that a death sentence imposed by a Field General
Court-Martial required unanimity.15 0 The Lewis Committee recommended that a unanimous vote be required on the findings (whether
of guilt or acquittal), but that no change be made in the rule relating
to the vote on the sentence. In the event of a disagreement there
should be a re-trial before a different court-martial. 15 1 The Government
has not accepted this recommendation. 52
143. A British commentator has observed that the Lewis Report gives "insufficient attention" to the problem of defense counsel. Griffith, Report of the
Army and Air Force Courts-Martial Committee 1946 (Cmd 7608), 12 MOD. L.
Rv. 223 (1949).
144. UCMJ art. 27, 50 U.S.C.A. § 591 (1951).
145. Ibid.
146. UCMJ art. 32, id. § 603.
147. UCMJ art. 52, id. § 627.

148. UCMJ art. 51 (a), id. § 626.
149. UCMJ art. 53, id. § 628.

150. MANuAL OF M=ILIARY LAw, PART I, 1951 at 48, 52, 281, 507 (8th ed. 1952).
151. CMD No. 7608 at 27-28, 55 (1949).
152. CmD No. 8141 at 15 (1951).
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Navy
The Navy rule has been the same as the Army, except that the death
sentence, and a finding of guilty where the offense carries a mandatory penalty of death, requires four votes out of five, or if the court
comprises more than five members, a two-thirds vote of those present.153 The Pilcher Committee, after considering the recommendations
1
of the Lewis Committee on this matter, recommended no change. '
Mr. R. E. Manningham-Buller, K.C., M.P., and Mr. A. L. Ungoed-,
Thomas, K.C., M.P., however, filed a minority report urging the views
of the Lewis Committee. 155 The Government has decided to make
no change. 156
Other Matters Relating to Voting
Neither report recommends any change in the present system, followed in all three services, whereby the vote is taken orally, in inverse
order of rank. The Lewis Report, however, recommended that the find15 7
ings and sentence in all cases be announced as soon as determined,
and the Government has accepted this recommendation. 58 The Pilcher
Committee does not seem to have considered the point.
IX
CONCLUSION
In the final analysis neither the British nor we have made any
really revolutionary changes in our systems of military justice. While
this may not please the advocates of all-out reform, it represents the
more realistic approach in that it recognizes that the problems are
too complex to admit of facile solutions. At least it seems significant
that both countries, proceeding independently, have reached very
similar results.
In both cases, the most significant change has been the introduction
of a civilian appellate tribunal. Along the same lines, the British have
placed the Judge Advocate General and his reviewing functions completely outside the armed services, and have assigned his other functions to new officers within the services. We have done nothing comparable to this. On the other hand, we have accomplished something
which the British have not attempted, the unification of our two different systems of military law, and the complete rewriting of our old
Articles in a modern, comprehensive Code of Military Justice, sup153. B.R. 11 at 12, 63 (1937).
154. CMD No. 8094 at 31-34, 46 (1950).

155. Id. at 49-53.
156. CMD No. 8141 at 20 (1951).
157.

CMD

No. 7608 at 26-27, 55 (1949).

158. Cwm No. 8141 at 6 (1951).
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plemented by a single manual of procedure. 159
For much too long a time, each of the two great English-speaking
nations has proceeded in almost complete ignorance of what the other
has been doing in the area of military justice. Now that each has
revised and reformed its system, almost by accident along parallel
lines, it is time that this gap be bridged. Each has much to learn of the
other, and the experience gained by the one under its new system
cannot help but be beneficial to the other under its reformed procedure.
If this article, by explaining to each what the other has done, helps
to bridge the gap, and pave the way toward such mutual exchange of
ideas and experience, it will have achieved its purpose.
159. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 1951; Exec. Order No.
10214, 16 FED. REG. 1301 (1951), as amended by Exec. Order No. 10256, 16 FED.
REc. 6013 (1951).

